Mayers, Lo and Chau proved unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible. It is shown that their proof is valid only for conventional quantum bit commitment protocols, in general it does not hold good. Unconditionally secure entangled and unentangled based (two steps and multisteps) quantum bit commitment protocols are presented. Unconditional security covers unknown attacks and attacks arising due to noise. For a single isolated bit, the probability of successful cheating is sharply zero.
Conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [1, 2] fail if the legitimate users become dishonest to each other. To remove these difficulty, bit commitment encoding was prescribed so that sender can not cheat receiver.
To elucidate the issue, let us recall the BB-84 protocol [1] , which works on two steps processes. In the first step, sender gives a qubit representing a definite bit value to receiver and in second step he reveals the key information regarding the bit value to receiver. The problem is: sender can flip the bit value by changing the key information although he committed the bit value in the first step. This is cheating. However the success of cheating decreases with the number of bits of the key. It was thought bit commitment encoding could detect such cheating. As if in cryptograhic communication quantum mechanics could resist a committed partner to be an imposter. If it be so, the long standing problems of cryptography such as secure ideal quantum coin tossing, were also believed to be solved.
The BB-84 QKD protocol can be called as first QBC protocol. However, authors observed that it is completely insecure against sender's EPR type attack. That is, the success of cheating is 100%. Later on a QBC protocol [3] was proposed and claimed to be probably secure against all types of cheating. Mayer; Lo and Chau proved [4, 5] it incorrect but message of their work is that there can not have any secure bit commitment protocol, although they worked on a particular model of bit commitment encoding. Recently kent [6] has shattered this belief. He showed that secure bit commitment protocol exists. As security of his protocol is based on causality not on laws of quantum mechanics, so it seems the proof is valid for all quantum bit commitment protocols [7] , which do not use causality for security. If it be so, relativity wins over quantum mechanics in cryptography. We shall see quantum mechanics is not too weak to do bit commitment encoding.
Let us come to the point why their proof can not be generalized for other quantum bit commitment protocol. Recall the reasoning of complete cheating. They concluded that complete cheating is possible when two density matrices associated with bit 0 and 1 are same i.e ρ 0 = ρ 1 . Because of this equivalence of two density matrices, it can be shown from Schimidt decomposition that after commit the states |0 sender can alone apply unitary transformation U to convert |0 to |1 and vice versa keeping the receiver in dark about this transformation. But it does not necessarily mean whenever ρ 0 = ρ 1 cheating will be possible.
Consider the following simple coding technique developed [8] [9] by the present author. Suppose these are two sequences of 0
• and 45 • (1:1) polarized states of photons. So ρ 0 = ρ 1 . The information regarding the above two sequences are shared between sender and receiver. By sharing these information they are in effect sharing the Hilbert spaces of ρ 0 and ρ 1 . Sender transmits the two sequences at random. But cheating is not possible as receiver can alone recover the bit value from the information they initially shared. Bit commitment encoding is not possible. In fact bit commitment encoding is not necessary. Both are mutually committed to each other. This probably reveals that cheating was possible in conventional QBC as because they did not share the Hilbert spaces not because of the equivalence of density matrices. This was first realized in the initial stage of the development of alternative QKD [8] . So sharing of Hilbert spaces can be a precondition to have a secure QBC. First we shall present entangled based QBC protocol and then unentangled based QBC protocol.
Suppose Alice has n pairs of EPR particles. Taking one particle of each pair, she arranges in a particular fashion and taking the partner particles she arranges in another way with the help of quantum memory. Suppose the two arrangements are :
, ψ n and
where
The arrangement of entanglement is: 1st particle of the 1st sequence and last particle of the 2nd sequence are entangled, and so on. These two arrangements represent bit 0. To represent bit 1, similarly she can arrange them in another two different ways
The arrangement of entanglement is: 1st particle of the 1st sequence and 1st particle of the 1st sequence are entangled, and so on. The above information is shared between them.
Bit commitment encoding can be executed in the following two steps processes. In the first step, Alice commits bit 0 sending S 0 and in the second step she reveals the key information sending s 0 . Similarly she can commit bit 1 sending S 1 in the 1st step and reveals its value sending s 1 in the second step. Instead of directly sending the 2nd sequence, the results of measurements on 2nd sequence in a pre-committed basis can also revealed. From the first incoming sequence S 0 or S 1 Bob can not recover the bit value.
He can alone recover the Alice's committed bit when he will get the partner sequence s 0 or s 1 . He can measure the spin in a fixed direction. Measurements on two sequences of EPR particle will produce correlated data. Bob's task is to identify the correlation from initially shared information regarding the arrangement of EPR particles. This is essentially bit identification from shared information. If dishonest Alice sends s 1 after S 0 or s 0 after S 1 , the one to one EPR correlation will be lost. Her cheating will be exposed.
The above is an EPR based QBC protocol. Using superposition state and following the same operational procedure non EPR based QBC protocol is given. Let the supperposition states are:
The sequence of the state |A In the above two schemes, bit commitment encoding are two step processes. QBC protocol can be realized in multi-steps procedures. In the first step Alice commits the bit value and reveals the commitment in many steps. Yet the commitment is secure. The encoding is same except we need higher dimensional Hilbert space to execute multi-steps QBC. As for example they can take GHZ state [11] Similarly she can commit bit 1. If they want to have a multi-steps disentangled based QBC scheme they can use a linear chain of superposition state of our earlier protocol. For three steps (1+2 or 2+1 ) QBC, the superposition states are:
Alice commits by sending the sequence of states | r and reveal the commitment by sending the sequences of states | t first and then sending the actual bit value carrying sequence of states | s .
In noisy situation Bob can not expect perfect correlation so Alice can execute the protocol dishonestly up to the noise level that need not to be bothered. Bob can statistically faithfully recover the bit value from noise due to initial sharing. The main advantage of initial sharing of information of bit preparation is that we do not have to be worried about any unknown attacks. Note that, sharing means pre-commitment and this can give security even for unknown attacks. Author feels that unconditional security claim should cover unknown attacks. The BCJL scheme [3] failed because presently known attack was unknown to the authors. The probability of the success of cheating is always zero. The security does not depend on time, space, technology, noise, and unknown attack. The proto-cols are truly unconditionally secure against cheating. If they want secure QKD along with secure QBC they can arrangement the entanglement in a more random manner than the above example of arrangements.
It is interesting to note that conventional QBC protocol totally fails because of entanglement. The same entanglement provides us secure QBC, although bit commitment is not the problem of alternative QKD. Note that bit commitment encoding can not be realized in all the sequence of unentangled state but can be realized in the sequence of any type of entangled state. For bit commitment issue, entanglement is not our enemy rather it is our friend indeed.
Following conventional quantum cryptography Lo and Chau proved [12] that secure ideal quantum coin-tossing (IQC) is impossible. This also can not be a generalized conclusion that we have already shown in another paper [x] . Our QKD can simply mimic ideal quantum coin tossing if sender and receiver randomly changes their status. That is, Alice sends a sequence to produce a 0 or 1 at Bob's hand at random and Bob sends a sequence to generate a 0 or 1 at Alice's hand at random. In effect faithful random numbers are generated at two distant locations because there is no chance of cheating each other. This can be done either by using entangled state or by unentangled state. Entanglement is not a necessary condition to have secure IQC. Secure QBC is built on the top of secure IQC. This is claimed to be always impossible by kent [13] . Still IQC is a weaker protocol because all QBC protocols are IQC protocols but reverse is not true.
The QBC/IQC and QKD protocols deal two different kind of security -security against cheating and security against eavesdropping respectively. Security of QKD degrades due to noise. Eavesdropper can manipulate noise. Recently we have shown [9] noise can also be manipulated by the users to get rid of noise related security problem of QKD. As noise based unconditionally secure QKD is possible, we can have two type of unconditional security in a single protocol. To date there is no other classical or quantum protocols which offer this double unconditional security. Therefore practical realization of QBC protocols will be a challenging task.
Author is greatly inspired by the earlier development of quantum cryptography.
